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LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
Charles W. Calomiris
What have we learned from the sovereign debt crises in Argentina
and Brazil, and what can the United States and the International
Monetary Fund do, if anything, to repair the damage, and to avoid
similar problems elsewhere?
Policy Lessons
I would emphasize five policy lessons:
• First, in emerging market countries (EMs), monetary policy—
or, what amounts to the same thing, exchange rate policy—is
often constrained by the need to finance government spending,
which underlies the eventual collapse of the exchange rate.
• Second, even well-regulated banking systems are highly vulner-
able to the risks of fiscal imbalance.
• Third, the IMF needs to stop intervening to prevent sovereign
defaults when they are necessary.
• Fourth, EM debt capacity cannot be captured adequately by the
ratio of sovereign debt to GDP. Export growth, and hence the
need to follow through on trade reform, is just as important a
fundamental determinant of debt repayment as discipline over
government spending.
• Fifth, “contagion” among sovereign debtors is selective.
Fiscal Imbalance and Monetary Collapse
Unlike the United States or the European Union, where an inde-
pendent central bank determines monetary policy, in most EMs, the
policies of central banks are often determined by arithmetic—the
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arithmetic that requires debts to be monetized, because that is the
only way that they can be repaid. When government debt grows too
fast, the government is unable to repay debt service with future taxes,
and the government forces debt monetization to occur. That problem
is at the core of every exchange rate collapse of the recent and distant
past. Typically, exchange rate depreciation precedes debt monetiza-
tion because the markets anticipate the inevitable monetization that
will occur.
Sometimes, fiscal imbalance does not show itself in government
accounts. That was true of Brazil in the 1970s, which used off-balance
sheet spending to disguise its fiscal imbalance (Brazil often ran an
official fiscal surplus alongside high inflation in the 1960s and 1970s).
Anticipated banking bailouts (which have been costing upward of 20
percent of GDP in the “twin-crises” countries of the past two de-
cades) are the most frequent source of fiscal imbalance in recent
crises. But Brazil and Argentina reached their current fiscal difficul-
ties and weak currencies largely in the “old-fashioned way”—by fail-
ing to rein in measured government spending programs.
In Argentina, government spending grew substantially in the final
years of the Menem administration, despite the crescendo of criticism
of the debt run-up and the visible need to reform the infamous
“coparticipation” system that hampered fiscal reform. And that debt
was almost entirely denominated in hard currency, despite the lack of
adequate growth in exports. The fiscal side of the liberalization cycle
in these and other countries seems to follow a familiar path: liberal-
ization and privatization result in new revenues for government and
ebullient expectations about future growth in GDP, government rev-
enues, and exports; market confidence in reform lowers the cost of
accessing foreign capital for both the private sector and the public
sector; EM governments cannot resist running deficits, but the fiscal
imbalance grows and eventually catches up with them.
Initially, the response to this fact is denial, with assistance from
multilateral lenders (and not only at the IMF—Ricardo Hausman was
described by Walter Molano, a prominent market analyst of Latin
American debt markets, as the lead salesman for Argentine govern-
ment debt in the mid-to-late 1990s, when Hausman was chief econ-
omist at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Then, the
IMF “programs” grow in size, along with the anti-growth tax hikes
that the IMF insists upon in return for providing “stability.” At this
point, debt yields rise and market “analysts” become largely political
forecasters: “Will this debt swap provide a short-run profit for me?
Will the IMF give us an exit in the not-too-distant future, and is the
current yield high enough to bet on that exit?” Economists who refer
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to long-run arithmetic are dismissed. Investment banks’ “research”
departments cooperate with the masquerade because not doing so
means that they will be cut off from millions in underwriting revenue
from the new debt offerings or debt swaps. When the collapse comes,
the IMF shakes its head about how unstable markets are, how irra-
tional investors are—all the more reason, of course, to increase IMF
footings.
Economic “emergence”—the combination of industry privatiza-
tion, trade liberalization, price stabilization, and financial deregula-
tion—would work much better if sovereigns did not see market op-
timism about their private-sector prospects as an opportunity to ramp
up their expenditures. Imagine how much better off the people of
Brazil and Argentina would be today if their governments had not
been able to borrow in the international bond market during the
1990s.
What were government officials thinking? Wouldn’t even a self-
serving politician or bureaucrat do better in the long run by waiting
until after growth had succeeded before increasing government ex-
penditures? The problem is twofold. First, politicians do not have
long-time horizons. That failure ultimately must be seen as a political
failure of democracy in EMs. Second, local bureaucratic interests can
be impervious to change even when politicians try to cut spending.
That was particularly true in Argentina and Brazil, where spending
was often decided at the local level but paid for at the national level.
Vulnerability of Banks in Emerging Markets
Argentina was one of the boldest and most successful reformers of
bank regulation during the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the banking
system had achieved (1) substantial foreign entry by European and
North American banks, (2) substantial privatization of loss-generating
provincial banks, and (3) real reform of deposit insurance, capital
regulation, liquidity regulation, and other prudential regulation and
supervision, which resulted in bank solvency, stability, and private
market discipline over bank risk taking. These reforms were impres-
sive, and were the result of years of hard work by Roque Fernandez,
Pedro Pou, and their staffs at the Banco Central (Calomiris and
Powell 2001).
But that very success produced a plum (in the form of banking
system liquidity and net worth) that was ripe for government picking.
Domingo Cavallo opined at a conference in 2001 that the regulatory
system in Argentina was too good, that banks were forced to maintain
too much liquidity and capital. He “fixed” that “problem” by forcing
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changes in the Banco Central’s personnel and rules to reduce banks’
liquidity, and more important, he used those freed-up banking system
resources to absorb ever more government debts by forcing banks to
“participate” in new government financing schemes. Ultimately, we
learned in Argentina that when sovereigns are at the end of their
rope, they’ll use all the power at their disposal—including financial
sector supervisory and regulatory powers—to address their short-
term needs, irrespective of the long-term consequences for the fi-
nancial system or the economy. That Cavallo would destroy the Ar-
gentine banks was predictable as early as April 2001 (Calomiris 2001a,
2001b, 2001c) because he was unwilling to recognize the necessity of
default and debt restructuring. His example was imitated recently by
President Chavez of Venezuela, who encouraged runs on Venezuelan
banks to penalize them for being unwilling to buy as much govern-
ment debt as he wanted them to buy.
Sovereign Defaults May Be Necessary
The IMF played the role of facilitator of Cavallo’s doomed plans in
2001 because Stanley Fischer believed that debt default would nec-
essarily produce an exchange rate collapse, and so the IMF decided
to take a very poor odds bet on Cavallo’s “plan.” Fischer understood
that depreciation was not a way out for the highly dollarized Argen-
tine economy, and so he was willing to do almost anything to avoid
depreciation. Fischer was right to want to avoid depreciation, but his
resistance to debt renegotiation was an error in economic reasoning.
The best chance for Argentina in 2001 was default. If the IMF and
the G7 had supported default by Argentina, if default had been ac-
companied by credible government expenditure reform and trade
liberalization, and if the IMF had offered liquidity assistance to sup-
port the currency board during the debt restructuring, then Argentina
could have written down its debt and avoided currency collapse.
(Supporting sustainable fixed exchange rates, after all, is the original
mandate of the IMF, isn’t it?). The combination of credible expen-
diture reform and sovereign debt reduction would have obviated the
long-run need for depreciation. A likely return to the precrisis trend
growth rate in labor productivity would have avoided the need for
long-run real exchange rate adjustment via deflation.
A reverse Dutch auction, combined with the use of “exit con-
sents”—preferably with an IMF-established floor on debt values, as
proposed by Lerrick and Meltzer (2001)—probably would have re-
sulted in a speedy restructuring process by minimizing holdout prob-




This approach might not have been politically feasible, of course,
but we will never know that because it was never tried. A “share-the-
pain” program for Argentina in early 2001 that would have simulta-
neously reduced debt service, liberalized trade, and reformed and
reduced expenditures might have been able to attract political sup-
port internally and externally. Both foreign creditors and domestic
residents surely would have been better off under this approach, and
many creditors I spoke with recognized the advantage of quickly
reducing the amount of debt by late 2000.
Part of the IMF’s opposition to this proposal, of course, reflected
concern about the size of the liquidity support that they might have
had to provide and the risk of loss to the IMF. Those are legitimate
concerns, but it is hard to see how the alternative policy that they
pursued—which placed the IMF and other official creditors at risk of
losing more than $20 billion—was a better bet, even from the narrow
perspective of the IMF’s risk of loss.
Importance of Trade Liberalization
A fairly reliable sign of deterioration in EM debt prices, which was
illustrated by both Argentina and Brazil, is the attempt by officials of
the finance ministry or the central bank to point to their moderate
debt-to-GDP ratios as indicators of their low risk of default. The
Argentine finance minister argued throughout 2001 that Argentina
could repay its debts, and that it was unfairly being singled out by
critics. His “proof” was that at a roughly 50 percent ratio of national
government debt-to-GDP, Argentina was in the middle of the pack of
sovereign debtors. True, and also not relevant, for two reasons. Mar-
kets look at trends in expenditure, which forecast future debt levels,
not just at current levels. The ramping up of government spending
after 1995, and market doubts about the political feasibility of con-
straining spending (doubts that, in the event, proved correct) were
more relevant than the current debt ratio.
Furthermore, an EM whose public and private borrowing is largely
in dollars must not only achieve domestic fiscal balance (slow growth
of government deficits relative to tax collections), it must also satisfy
an external constraint requiring that future hard currency debt service
be paid with net export receipts. Countries cannot run external Ponzi
schemes, depending on ever-growing future capital inflows to pay
preexisting hard currency debt service: eventually exports have to
grow relative to imports to pay those debts. Argentina and Brazil
never achieved the export-to-GDP ratios that they should have
achieved, and that they could have achieved, if domestic politics had
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not constrained trade liberalization and labor reforms. In Argentina,
even if export growth had been higher, the lack of discipline over
domestic public finances probably would have produced default in
any case. The lesson, of course, is that trade liberalization can help to
stabilize economies. The practical difficulty, again, is the lack of a
long-time horizon in domestic politics. That produces both the debt
run-up and the resistance to removing protectionist policies that pre-
vent export growth. Free trade may benefit everyone in the long run,
but in the short run it can pose political costs for liberalizers, which
discourages trade liberalization.
Contagion Is Selective
It is worth remembering that this lesson, like the preceding four, is
not news. After all, Chile had largely avoided the fallout from the
Mexican crisis of 1994–95. And Singapore did not collapse during the
Asian crisis of 1997. But the lack of uniformity in sovereign yield
changes in the wake of the Argentine collapse, and the subsequent
decline in Brazilian debt values has made it especially clear that
contagion in the wake of one country’s crisis is not a result of mass
hysteria but rather of fundamental changes in markets that affect
some countries more than others. Contagion reflects three kinds of
channels that link other countries to crisis countries: export and im-
port links (either through competition among exporters, as in the
fallout for Indonesia and Malaysia after the Thai collapse, or import
market linkages, as in the case of Uruguay’s reaction to Argentina’s
crisis), direct financial links between the crisis country and other
countries (which were of some importance for explaining the trans-
mission of the Russian crisis to Brazil, the Argentine crisis to Uru-
guay, and the Asian crisis to Korea), and indirect, general-equilibrium
financial links associated with global portfolio rebalancing (which
explain much of the problems experienced by Brazil and Argentina in
the wake of the Mexican crisis, and of Brazil in the wake of the
Russian crisis).
Indirect, portfolio rebalancing links are an international form of
what is sometimes called a “credit crunch” or a “capital crunch” when
it occurs within a domestic banking system. Financial institutions
(banks, hedge funds, and others) rely on creditors as sources of their
funding, and those creditors have limited tolerance for increases in
default risk. When institutions suffer large losses in one category of
their assets (e.g., Mexican bonds), they must restore the low default
risk on their own debts by selling other risky assets. Countries that
issue risky debt (like newly liberalized Argentina and Brazil as of
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1994) are especially vulnerable to asset sell-offs that seek to restore
financial institutions’ creditworthiness in response to losses elsewhere.
The selective nature of contagion is important because it implies
that countries can, to a large extent, control their own destinies
through export market growth and diversification, and by placing
limits on the growth of government debt during the early stages of
liberalization. Furthermore, domestic bank regulation can play an
important role in reducing vulnerability to either internal or external
shocks. Insolvent Korean banks’ willingness to invest in high-risk In-
donesian securities, for example, was largely a reflection of the weak-
ness of Korean bank regulation. And the weakness of the Korean
banking system, which was known to be insolvent before the Asian
crisis, further fueled capital flight once the crisis spilled into Korea.
Of course, implementing the key policy lesson—that banking systems
must be strengthened—is extremely difficult for the same reason that
it is hard to limit government expenditures or to ensure continuing
trade liberalization. Weak domestic bank regulation is a convenient
means to channel hidden taxpayer subsidies (via the banking system
“safety net”) to banks and borrowers taking excessive risks at taxpay-
ers’ expense. Those favored few are given special access to subsidies
through their access to bank charters and bank credit. The iron tri-
angle of banks, government, and large firms that control the political
process and the allocation of credit through the financial system (a
system that is often referred to, in shorthand, as “crony capitalism”) is
the reason for resistance to financial sector reforms that would limit
risk taking.
In summary, the lessons of the Argentine and Brazilian crises are
not new, nor is there much likelihood that the recent crises will
increase the chances that these lessons will be learned in Brazil,
Argentina, or in other countries. The central problem, both before
and after these crises, has not been a lack of available information
from which to draw useful policy conclusions, but rather, the lack of
domestic political will within EMs to implement policies that avoid
financial crises. The multilateral institutions (the IMF, the IDB, and
the World Bank) on balance have not played a helpful role in Argen-
tina or Brazil, and surely global political economy is part of the ex-
planation for that fact. Still, it would be wrong to place the primary
blame for failure on the IMF, the IDB, or the G7.
The last thousand years of human history indicate that there is no
means to sustained economic growth or to long-term political reform
other than the establishment of a competitive and internationally
open economic system (Jones 1988, Landes 1999, Maddison 2001,
Calomiris 2001d). The primary constraint against progress in this
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direction, now and in the past, has been resistance to such reforms by
entrenched rulers and special interests that do not see short-term
advantages from improving the long-term lot of the average citizen.
In this sense, there is nothing new to be learned from the crises in
Argentina and Brazil.
What We Can Do
What can we in the United States, through G7 policies, the IMF,
and other agents, do to encourage developing country emergence,
growth, and stability? Trade policy is the most important single in-
fluence we can have. The effect of liberalizing our own barriers to
EM imports would be far and away the most important source of
“aid” the G7 could provide EMs (IMF and World Bank 2001).
How can IMF, World Bank, and regional development bank poli-
cies be improved? I continue to believe that the solutions advocated
by the Meltzer Commission (IFIAC 2000), on which I served, are the
best path forward, although they do not constitute a complete set of
reforms. The emphasis in our report was to focus each of the multi-
laterals on separate areas of policy (with the IMF focusing narrowly
on liquidity support, not bailouts, and the other agencies providing
aid to support institution building, poverty alleviation, and global
public goods), to provide more flexible and effective means for chan-
neling such assistance (e.g., through grants in many cases, rather than
loans), and to establish credible means of holding multilaterals ac-
countable for their performance. The World Bank is moving in this
direction, and the IMF has made some changes in its lending prac-
tices that are consistent with our recommendations, but overall, the
multilaterals are still muddling through without the proper focus,
accountability, or mechanisms necessary for achieving desired results.
Is there a need for the IMF to use its authority to change the rules
of sovereign workouts and to become a bankruptcy process facilitator
or arbiter to assist in the resolution of sovereign debt crises? The good
news is that policymakers in Washington are finally realizing that
“participation” in losses by private sector participants and speedy debt
restructuring are important to restore growth and to avoid excess risk
taking by private investors in anticipation of IMF bailouts (the
“moral-hazard” overlending problem). But having finally arrived at
the conclusion that the IMF should avoid bailing out insolvent sov-
ereign debtors or prolonging the resolution of unsustainable debt
burdens, the IMF now is leaping to the conclusion that a formal debt
resolution process must be established by statute and that it should
manage debt resolutions. Neither of these conclusions is warranted,
at least for now. A better policy would be to reform IMF intervention,
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and see whether private market creditors and sovereigns can sort out
their differences sufficiently well without the IMF. That contractual
approach would rely on existing techniques and institutions, perhaps
with some contractual modifications going forward (like the adoption
of collective action clauses in bonds), once the IMF has adopted a
more limited role in debt crises.
Opponents of the IMF bankruptcy proposal worry about several
possible problems. First, the IMF is “conflicted” because it is a credi-
tor. It has become quite possible that Argentina and Brazil will de-
fault on IMF loans (the Argentines have even announced that they
would do so before using their remaining reserves to repay the IMF),
and long-term losses to the IMF are now quite possible, if not likely.
Some private creditors regard that as a positive development because
it might limit their own losses. Some academics also regard that
possibility favorably because it would chasten the IMF and possibly
discourage it from continuing to promote bailouts. The IMF, of
course, regards its own lending as properly senior to all private and
Paris Club (bilateral government) debts. But, regardless of one’s view
on these matters, surely the IMF is in a conflicted position, and is not
the appropriate entity to influence decisions about whether and how
much official creditors should share the pain of debt restructuring.
Second, it is likely that a bankruptcy process would entail substan-
tial discretionary authority for the arbiter of that process and that
could create a new political “football” within an already highly politi-
cized organization (the IMF), despite IMF claims that it would only
handle procedural matters and not make important disrectionary de-
cisions. And it would be hard to imagine an alternative bankruptcy
arbiter that would be immune to political capture. Would a system
that would favor some countries and creditors in its bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, for political reasons, be a desirable alternative to the current
already politicized system? That is a hard question to answer, but
thinking about it certainly leads one to look for other alternatives.
Third, establishing a bankruptcy process may add costs to sovereign
debt spreads. That is not entirely a bad thing if you view EM sover-
eign overborrowing as a key problem to be avoided (as I do). Still, it
would be preferable not to add costs unnecessarily, but instead, to
reform sovereign debt markets by eliminating IMF bailouts, which
would provide adequate incentives for creditors to take a long-term
view of sovereign risk and limit the supply of credit to EM sovereigns.
Fourth, there are alternatives to the IMF bankruptcy proposal that
avoid most or all of its shortcomings and achieve most or all of its
objectives (especially the important objectives of coordinating the
multiplicity of sovereign claims, and avoiding holdout problems dur-
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ing renegotiation). Alternatives to bankruptcy entail creditor-debtor
renegotiation without any third-party involvement. The alternative
contractual approach might be enhanced by greater use of majority
voting clauses or, alternatively, a reliance on existing contracts and
procedures combined with innovative renegotiation strategies (re-
verse Dutch auctions with exit consents) to overcome holdout prob-
lems and consolidate disparate debts.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review in detail the relative
merits of the contractual approach, except to note that there is every
reason to believe, based on logic, evidence, and judicial precedents,
that the contractual approach could work, even without mandating
majority voting clauses (see Buchheit and Gulati 2002 for a history of
workout arrangements that suggests various options). The chance for
success of this approach would be increased if the IMF provided bona
fide liquidity assistance to sovereigns during debt workouts (as dis-
tinct from IMF bailouts). Lerrick and Meltzer (2001) have outlined a
simple, creative, and promising approach to providing such liquidity
assistance and have argued that doing so not only would provide
incentives for swaps (by giving bidders liquid markets in which to
trade), but also would make it harder for “vulture” funds to acquire
controlling positions in “orphan” debt issues. Simulations of this re-
negotiation process involving real market participants have been very
encouraging.
It is also possible that it would be desirable to encourage or even
require the inclusion of collective action clauses (CACs) in future
sovereign debt offerings. The argument for the efficiency of CACs is
that having them in place would resolve many of the legal uncertain-
ties posed by the current use of exit consents and other similar de-
vices. Of course, arguing for the efficiency of a contractual feature is
not the same as arguing that it should be required. If it is so efficient,
then why must it be mandated?
The most plausible argument for requiring governments to adopt
CACs is that doing so would have a positive effect on IMF behavior
(an argument frequently made by IMF officials with respect to the
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, or SDRM). The IMF
would be more likely to avoid counterproductive bailouts if its bu-
reaucrats, and the G-7 finance ministers who control them, were able
to see a clear and viable alternative to bailouts in the form of an
orderly restructuring process. The presence of CACs would make
that alternative clearer. Of course, that possibility would not neces-
sarily appeal to either creditors or to sovereign debtors, who might
prefer IMF bailouts to the economic and political hardships
that accompany debt write-downs. That preference would lead the
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market to avoid CACs precisely because they would be socially ben-
eficial.
Under the assumption that CACs would add some cost to debt
issues (an argument that has yet to be proven), there are additional
arguments in favor of public policy to encourage or require CACs.
First, if EM rulers are myopic (as I argued above), then they will
tend to prefer cheap credit today over credit that is cheaper in the
long run. That is, they will undervalue the contingent benefits to their
citizens of CACs (which lower costs of renegotiation), particularly if
they fear that such clauses will raise market yields (there is significant
concern on the parts of the government of Mexico, Brazil, and others
that this would occur). Even if CACs are efficient, if they are costly,
myopic sovereigns may not choose to adopt them voluntarily.
Second, to the extent that CACs would limit negative externalities
across borders (so-called contagion effects) their benefits would not
be fully internalized by issuers and their creditors, which might also
lead to an underuse of socially desirable CACs.1
Third, there is an important distinction between potentially ben-
eficial IMF assistance in establishing new rules for collective action by
creditors, and inappropriate IMF incursions into restructurings, in
the form of its proposed SDRM. In particular, the IMF should not be
in the business of establishing statutes that effectively change ex ante
contracts agreed upon by debtors and creditors. I understand that the
existence of debts without CACs may prove inconvenient during the
transition period toward a new set of rules, but in my view that
inconvenience (even if it produces one or two cases of protracted
delay in debt restructuring) is well worth preserving the basic sanctity
of contracts. And, there are far better ways of dealing with that tran-
sition problem (e.g., encouraging the swapping of old non-CAC debt
for new CAC debt).
Fourth, we should recognize that we have little empirical basis for
the belief that a contractual approach, even without majority voting
clauses, would not work better. Do we really know that vesting classes
of creditors with veto powers over restructuring plans (as the IMF
proposes to do in its SDRM mechanism) would resolve holdout prob-
lems faster than the exertion of raw power by sovereigns in debt
swaps? I do not believe that it would. Sovereigns have much more
1Even though sovereigns and market participants seem to fear that collective action clauses
would substantially raise borrowing costs, that is not obvious. It may be that, by reducing
costs of renegotiation, collective action clauses would even lower borrowing costs. That
seems quite possible, especially since, in my view, the presence of such clauses would have
little effect on the probability of a sovereign default.
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power to force agreement with a restructuring plan than do private
debtors. Some point to the Argentine crisis as evidence that informal
renegotiation under current rules cannot work. That is a strange ar-
gument since the Argentines, under IMF tutelage, resisted trying
that approach. What we have learned over the past several crises is
that even under the current international policy regime (which in-
cludes IMF bailouts and excludes bona fide IMF liquidity assistance)
there have been some successes in informal renegotiation (notably, in
Ecuador).
Fifth, given the little we really know about how well renegotiations
could work in a world without IMF promotion of bailouts or delays
under any of the three proposed new regimes (contractual renego-
tiation without CACs, renegotiation in the presence of CACs, or a
formal bankruptcy process), and given the irreversibility of establish-
ing a bankruptcy process, it seems advisable to follow a cautious
approach. That means trying the contractual renegotiation approach
first, and contemplating far-reaching, hard-to-reverse changes (like an
IMF bankruptcy process) only after it has been clearly demonstrated
that contractual renegotiation along one or more of the lines sug-
gested by Buchheit and Gulati (2002) and Lerrick and Meltzer (2001)
really cannot work. A rush to adopt the SDRM might forestall ben-
eficial private adaptations within the contractual approach that would
otherwise occur. That is essentially the policy position taken by the
four Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees of Europe, Japan,
Latin America, and the United States (2002) in their joint resolution
on SDRM.
A gradual approach to reform would also have the distinct advan-
tage of displaying some modesty on the part of the IMF and the G7
about their ability to redesign the financial world on the basis of their
theories and get it right. If only IMF bureaucrats could approach
their work with the spirit of humility that Friedrich A. Hayek recom-
mended:
What we must learn is that human civilization has a life of its own,
that all our efforts to improve things must operate within a working
whole which we cannot entirely control, and the operation of whose
forces we can hope merely to facilitate and assist so far as we
understand them. Our attitude ought to be similar to that of the
physician toward a living organism [Hayek 1960: 69–70].
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